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Individual Health Insurance Mandates and 
Financial Distress:  A Few Notes from the Debtor-
Creditor Research and Debates 
Melissa B. Jacoby*
Although I am a debtor-creditor researcher and not a health law 
expert, I could not resist the invitation of Dean Gail Agrawal and 
Professor Elizabeth Weeks to comment briefly on Massachusetts’s recent 
ambitious efforts to secure universal health insurance coverage,1 
particularly because Massachusetts is not alone in experimenting with 
mandates to achieve higher rates of insurance.2  My assessments at this 
time are necessarily tentative; not only am I a relative novice regarding 
* George R. Ward Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Thanks to
Gail Agrawal and Elizabeth Weeks for inviting me to participate in the Symposium on the 
Massachusetts Plan and the Future of Universal Coverage, Nick Sexton and Michael Shumaker for 
helping me locate books and reports, and the University of North Carolina School of Law for 
financial support.  Special thanks to Stephen Ware for his thoughtful written response.  Although the 
editing process precluded meaningful reply here, I look forward to engaging with his ideas in future 
work.  This writing is based on my oral remarks at the Symposium.  The supporting research was 
conducted in fall 2006 and winter 2007 and reflects the state of events at that time.   
1. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, ch. 58, 2006
Mass. Acts (forthcoming), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm 
[hereinafter Mass. Plan].  The technical correction bill is An Act Relative to Health Care Access, ch. 
324, 2006 Mass. Acts, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060324.htm 
[hereinafter Mass. Plan].  A relatively neutral account of the basic components may be found in 
APRIL GRADY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, The Massachusetts Health Reform Plan: A 
Brief Overview, May 26, 2006, http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22447_20060526.pdf. 
2. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s plan similarly relies on a combination of individual
mandates and employer mandates.  Press Release, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., Gov. 
Schwarzenegger Tackles California’s Broken Health Care System, Proposes Comprehensive Plan to 
Help All Californians (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/5057/; 
see also Press Release, Edward G. Rendell, Governor of Penn., Governor Rendell’s ‘Prescription for 
Pennsylvania.’  Will Ensure Access to Quality Health Care in a Variety of Settings (Jan. 18, 2007), 
available at http://www.state.pa.us/papower/cwp/view.asp?A=11&Q=459427 (discussing health 
heart proposal).  U.S. Senator Ron Wyden’s plan uses individual mandates, albeit in a slightly 
different way, and also cuts the tie between place of employment and source of health insurance 
coverage.  Healthy Americans Act, S. 334, 110th Cong. (2007); Press Release, Ron Wyden, U.S. 
Senator, Senator Wyden Leads Federal Debate on Health Care Reform (Jan. 16, 2007), available at 
http://wyden.senate.gov/media/speeches/2007/01162007_Healthy_Americans.html.  Prevailing 
presidential policy prefers tax incentives rather than penalties to encourage health insurance 
purchasing.  George W. Bush, President of the United States, President’s Radio Address (Jan. 20, 
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070120.html. 
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the nation’s “most complicated industry,”3 but the Massachusetts 
legislature left to the Commonwealth Connector Board the task of 
defining what constitutes an “affordable” plan for people of various 
incomes, and this limits my ability to comment on those affordability 
standards in greater detail.4
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts could have framed the major 
policy issue it sought to tackle in terms of escalating medical costs.5  
Instead, it framed the issue in terms of insurance coverage. Lack of 
insurance is often used as a proxy for two problems: lack of regularized 
access to health care delivery systems,6 and lack of protection from risk 
of major financial liabilities.7  In other words, covering the uninsured is 
not so much an end as it is a means to achieve these objectives.   
An individual mandate is one of several tools in the Massachusetts 
Plan to increase the number of citizens with health insurance, and thus 
3. See Donald M. Berwick & Sachin H. Jain, The Basis for Quality Care in Prepaid Group
Practice, in TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY HEALTH SYSTEM: THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROMISE OF 
PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE 22, 42 (Alain C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen eds., 2004) (explaining 
why “[h]ealth care has been called the nation’s most complicated industry”). 
4. The Commonwealth Connector Board is charged with determining when plans are
unaffordable such that an individual mandate would be inapplicable; it also is responsible for 
determining how much, if anything, low-income people should pay for subsidized insurance.  See, 
e.g., Jeffrey Krasner, Senator Says Health Plan Rates Too High: Low-Income Residents Could Be
Priced Out By Proposal, He Warns, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2006 (arguing that Massachusetts
“wants to charge too much for health insurance coverage”); BOARD OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
HEALTH INSURANCE CONNECTOR AUTHORITY, MINUTES OF AUGUST 17, 2006 MEETING (noting that
a report from the affordability committee was discussed, but no official position on affordability
standards was adopted).  At the time of the Symposium, the Board was focused on enrolling the
subsidized lowest income citizens.  See COMMONWEALTH CARE IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS
REPORT (2006) (discussing the status of “Commonwealth Care” as of Oct. 11, 2006). 
5. See generally Edward J. Larson & Marc Dettman, The Impact of HSAs on Health Care
Reform: Preliminary Results After One Year, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2005) 
(reviewing medical costs). 
6. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA 38–93,
105–119 (2003). 
7. See, e.g., Economic Challenges Facing Middle Class Families: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Economic Challenges Hearing] 
(Testimony of Diane Rowland, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.) (identifying delivery and financial 
risk aspects of health insurance); KATHERINE SWARTZ, REINSURING HEALTH: WHY MORE MIDDLE-
CLASS PEOPLE ARE UNINSURED AND WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN DO 128 (2006) (discussing 
difficulty of attaining adequate health care delivery for uninsured families); J.P. Ruger, The Moral 
Foundations of Health Insurance, 100 Q. J. MED. 53, 55 (2007) (discussing the potential risks from 
being uninsured); see also Christian Nordqvist, Is Massachusetts Health Plan Pure Ideology or 
Good Economics?, MED. NEWS TODAY, Apr. 16, 2006, 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/healthnews.php?newsid=41708 (noting that the goal of universal 
health insurance should not be perceived as purely ideological given the current level of health 
spending).  See generally DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 114 (2004) (“Just about everyone agrees that all people should 
have health insurance.”). 
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presumably to address these underlying issues.8  This also is a feature of 
other state and national health care reform proposals.9  The individual 
mandate is a requirement to buy insurance or to pay a financial penalty to 
be enforced by the state department of revenue.10  It is a “pay or play” 
provision of sorts, or, perhaps more accurately, “pay or pay.”11  The 
individual mandate cannot prevent Massachusetts’s young and healthy 
residents from moving to New Hampshire or other nearby states to avoid 
its reach, but it is intended to force them into insurance pools to balance 
out risk.12  The mandate also overrides subjective beliefs about the value 
of and need for health insurance, which is an issue I will return to at the 
end of my commentary.13   
An individual mandate can be somewhat harsh (or perhaps futile) on 
its own because, among other things, the price of insurance must affect 
the take-up rate to some extent.14  Researchers from across the 
ideological spectrum likely agree that low-income people lack the 
financial means to buy many health insurance products regardless of 
their subjective assessments of its value.15  The Massachusetts Plan seeks 
8. Mass. Plan, supra note 1, § 12. 
9. See, e.g., Press Release Arnold Schwarzenegger, supra note 2; Wyden, supra note 2. 
10. See Commonwealth Connector, Frequently Asked Questions for Individuals,
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=hicterminal&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Qhic (follow “Commonwealth 
Choice: Overview” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 29, 2007) (“Individuals who cannot show proof of 
health insurance coverage by Dec. 31, 2007, will lose their personal income tax exemption when 
filing their 2007 income taxes.  The 2006 personal exemption is $3,850 for an individual, which 
translates into a tax savings of approximately $204 for an individual (5.3 percent of $3,850).  Failure 
to meet the requirement in 2008 will result in a fine for each month the individual does not have 
coverage.  The fine will equal 50 percent of the least costly, available insurance premium that meets 
the standard for creditable coverage.”). 
11. See Mass. Plan, supra note 1, at CRS-4 (stating that “those who do not have insurance and
are not exempt from the mandate will lose their state income tax personal exemption”).  The 
Commonwealth Connector will be a clearinghouse for plans available for purchase by uninsured 
individuals.  For an explanation of Commonwealth Choice, including plans for young adults, see 
Commonwealth Connector, Connector Programs, http://www.mass.gov (search for “Commonwealth 
Connector Programs”; then follow “Connector Programs” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 3, 2007). 
12. Cost-based refusal of insurance coverage by healthier young people is thought to contribute
to adverse selection.  See SWARTZ, supra note 7, at 129. 
13. See generally Sherry Glied, Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage, in
6 FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH 55, 67 (David M. Cutler & Alan M. Garber eds., 2003) 
(“Health insurance expansions, then, intend to encourage uninsured people to behave in ways that do 
not necessarily maximize their subjective utility but rather address specific public-policy 
objectives.”). 
14. See, e.g., Michael Chernew et al., Increasing Health Insurance Costs and the Decline in
Health Insurance Coverage, 40 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1021, 1029, 1033–34 (2005) (describing a 
statistical correlation between premium increases and declines in insurance coverage). 
15. As for everyone else, see, for example, Helen Levy & Thomas DeLeire, What Do People
Buy When They Don’t Buy Health Insurance and What Does that Say About Why They Are 
Uninsured 25–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9826, 2003), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9826.pdf (reporting differences in spending habits between insured 
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to address this by subsidizing the acquisition of certain health insurance 
products by citizens with incomes at or below 300% of the poverty level 
through its Commonwealth Care program.16  This component of the 
Massachusetts Plan was made a priority, and, as of the time of this 
Symposium, enrollment was underway.17  But beyond the lowest income 
residents, the enforceability of the individual mandate is conditioned on 
the availability of health plans that are “affordable,” which is a term that 
the enabling legislation did not define.18
Let us assume for now that the Massachusetts Plan will decrease the 
number of uninsured people in the Commonwealth and stabilize the 
coverage of some who previously cycled through periods of 
uninsurance.19  Let us also assume that, in so doing, the Massachusetts 
Plan will hook previously uninsured people into health care delivery 
networks.  This still leaves the question of whether the Massachusetts 
Plan makes progress toward the second underlying goal, which is to 
protect individuals against financial risk.  I refer to this risk more 
generally as medical-related financial distress.  By expending taxpayer 
resources and requiring greater out-of-pocket outlays from citizens 
through the individual mandate of the Massachusetts Plan, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts does not necessarily make its citizens 
more financially secure; it might just be shifting around the insecurity, 
which ultimately may undercut health care delivery goals. 
and uninsured households). 
16. Mass. Plan, supra note 1, §§ 8, 45.  For how the existence of Commonwealth Care will
affect the available options for low-income Massachusetts residents, see generally MASSACHUSETTS 
MEDICAID POLICY INSTITUTE & U. MASS. MEDICAL SCHOOL CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY AND 
RESEARCH, PATHWAYS TO PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR MASSACHUSETTS 
RESIDENTS (Dec. 2006).  For a chart of how much low-income people will pay in premiums or co-
pays, see Commonwealth Connector, Commonwealth Care: 4 Plan Types are Offered, 
http://www.mass.gov/Qhic/docs/CCare_Presentation_FebUpdate.ppt#420,2,CommonwealthCare 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2007).  For general eligibility guidelines, see Commonwealth Connector, 
Commonwealth Care, Goalmind: Eligibililty,
https://www.macommonwealthcare.com/goalmind/login/external/eligibility.jsp (last visited Mar. 10, 
2007).  For a justification of a subsidies approach rather than a pure cost containment approach, see, 
for example, Chernew et al., supra note 14, at 1035. 
17. Commonwealth Connector, http://www.myhealthconnector.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2007). 
18. See, e.g., John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look at
the Issues, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVE w432, w436–37 (explaining that the law did not 
define affordability); COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH 
CARE REFORM PLAN (2006), available at http://www.ktt.org/uninsured/upland/7494.pdf (same); 
COMMUNITY CATALYST INC., MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH REFORM: WHAT IT DOES; HOW IT WAS 
DONE; CHALLENGES AHEAD (Apr. 21, 2006),
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/resource.php?base_id=1023 (same). 
19. Massachusetts already has a lower uninsured population than many other states.  Tom
Miller, Massachusetts: More Mirage Than Miracle, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w450, 
w450. 
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In theory, insurance coverage might reduce the need for 
bankruptcy,20 lessen the reliance on high-priced credit products to 
smooth health care consumption, cut the demand for debt collectors 
specializing in self-pay medical receivables, produce declines in state 
debt collection lawsuits and resulting coercive collection, and reduce 
credit report notations for medical debt delinquency.  Yet, empirical 
research suggests that being labeled as “insured”—the mere fact of 
insurance coverage—is not now synonymous with protection from 
financial risk arising from medical problems, and perhaps never will 
be.21
Some of the most severe financial consequences of medical problems 
not covered by insurance are indirect, such as lost income and 
opportunity.22  Regarding the direct costs of medical care, bankruptcy 
and health services research suggests that insurance coverage does not 
provide complete financial protection.23  The first issue is the price of 
insurance itself. To the extent that rising medical costs send health 
insurance premiums to less affordable levels, requiring health insurance 
purchases could increase household financial difficulties rather than 
reduce them.24  By imposing an individual mandate without seeking to 
20. See Sherry Glied, Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage: Is Something
Better Than Nothing?, in 6 FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POL’Y RES. 55, 72 (David M. Cutler & Alan M. 
Garber eds., 2003) (noting that health insurance can protect against the consequences of a common 
bankruptcy-triggering event, unforeseen illness or accident). 
21. For a review of some of the recent data on this point, see Economic Challenges Hearing, 
supra note 7 (noting that the scope of coverage is often limited and leaves insureds with large out-of-
pocket expenses). 
22. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative
Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 561 (2006) (“[M]edical-
related indebtedness is not just a consequence of direct medical bills.”).  For an example from the 
medical literature recognizing the need for increased study of indirect costs, see K. Robin Yabroff et 
al., Burden of Illness in Cancer Survivors: Findings from a Population-Based National Sample, 96 J. 
NAT’L CANCER INST. 1322, 1322 (2004), stating that “prior research in estimating the burden of 
cancer in the United States has focused on the direct medical costs of treating illness . . . . Other 
components of cancer burden—productivity and intangible costs—have received less attention.”  For 
a report on findings regarding lost days from work among cancer survivors as compared to control 
group see id. at 1327.  As John Colombo has observed, at least one insurance company—AFLAC—
has recognized a market for insurance against indirect costs.  John D. Colombo, Federal and State 
Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and Healthcare for the Poor, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433 
(forthcoming 2007). 
23. The calculation of “under-insurance” is contested.  I review the under-insurance and
financial burden literature in greater detail in Melissa B. Jacoby,  The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2007). 
24. For an analysis of 2003 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data on premium cost and
burden, see Jessica S. Banthin & Didem M. Bernard, Changes in Financial Burdens for Health 
Care: National Estimates for the Population Younger than 65 Years, 1996 to 2003, 296 JAMA 
2712, 2715 tbl.1 (2006).  See also SWARTZ, supra note 7, at 4–6 (identifying rising costs of medical 
care as part of reason lack of insurance among middle class is rising); id. at 125 (discussing rising 
insurance premiums); David M. Cutler, Employee Costs and the Decline in Health Insurance 
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tackle health care costs, the Massachusetts Plan arguably puts its citizens 
in a bit of a bind.25  As noted earlier, the legislature did not statutorily 
define “affordability,” so it voted in favor of this plan without knowing 
which citizens would be absolved from the individual mandate on that 
basis.26  As in many other means testing contexts, the details of the 
affordability determinations are likely to be controversial.27  In any 
event, it remains possible that some households will be more financially 
stressed from health care costs with the individual mandate in place than 
without it.  In addition, the penalty against an individual for failure to 
buy insurance is unlikely to be dischargeable if that individual files for 
bankruptcy.28  This increases the significance of relying on individual 
mandates without also focusing on cost containment. 
In addition to the financial impact of insurance premiums, there of 
course is the impact of out-of-pocket patient obligation (co-pays, 
deductibles, caps, exclusions).  Insurance is so important in part because 
of the difficulty of predicting who will encounter catastrophic illness and 
when.29  Yet, the medical expenses encountered by the vast majority of 
Coverage, in FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH 28, 35 (David M. Cutler & Alan M. Garber 
eds., 2003); Michael Chernew et al., supra note 14, at 1029, 1033–34 (reporting on drops in 
coverage by increases in premium cost). 
25. See, e.g., Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Massachusetts Health Reform Bill:
A False Promise of Universal Coverage, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, Apr. 6, 2006, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0406-35.htm (discussing the likelihood that many 
uninsured individuals will not have the means to pay for health care coverage).  For an ominous 
prediction of rising health care costs, see, for example, HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ 
WITH MELISSA COX, CAN WE SAY NO?  THE CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE 1–2 (2005); 
SWARTZ, supra note 7, at 4–6. 
26. The Commonwealth Connector Board’s website includes documents relating to board
meetings that suggested some work on the issue, but, as of the time of this Symposium, had not yet 
resolved it.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Bob Carey, Dir. of Planning and Dev., to Commonwealth 
Health Ins. Connector Authority Bd. (Oct. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/Qhic/docs/financial_hardship_waiver.doc (discussing difficulty of establishing 
standards given the inherent subjectivity in what constitutes essential expenses); Memorandum from 
Jon Kingsdale to Bd. of the Connector, Executive Dir. Of Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector 
Auth. (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/Qhic/docs/eligibility_memo.doc 
(discussing recommendations for waivers of certain Plan requirements). 
27. For a preview of those debates in the context of the lowest-income citizens, see, for
example, Krasner, supra note 4.  See generally Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 18 (analyzing the 
Massachusetts bill and assessing its potential for success). 
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2000) (excepting governmental penalties from discharge).  The
federal individual mandate recently proposed by Senator Ron Wyden explicitly excepts from 
discharge in bankruptcy the financial penalty for failure to buy insurance.  The Healthy Americans 
Act, S. 334, 110th Cong. (2007). 
29. See SWARTZ, supra note 7, at 61–65 (explaining that a large proportion of health
expenditures in any given year stems from a very small percentage of individuals, and discussing 
why it is difficult to predict who will have the highest medical expenses).  See generally Leon 
Wyszewianski, Financially Catastrophic and High-Cost Cases: Definitions, Distinctions, and Their 
Implications for Policy Formation, 23 INQUIRY 382 (1986) (distinguishing cases considered 
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the population in any given year are not catastrophic, and yet many 
households nonetheless struggle with them, or at least fail to pay them.30  
Federal Reserve researchers looking at a nationally representative sample 
of credit reports from the late 1990s found that 36.5% of the notations for 
medical bills were for $100 or less and that 70% were for $250 or less.31  
Only 4.2% of court judgments that could be identified as medical were 
for $5,000 or more.32  Some insurance plans become “affordable” by 
shifting more financial responsibility for medical bills to patients, and 
thus an individual mandate coupled with an affordability threshold could 
increase medical debt delinquency.  
Smaller unpaid bills may signify policy issues other than 
inadequately comprehensive health insurance.33  According to some 
researchers, average American households experience large variations in 
financial status.34  This suggests that they may have difficulty absorbing 
catastrophic based on a percentage of family income from cases considered high cost based on 
absolute dollar amount). 
30. I review some of the studies and explore the non-catastrophic expense puzzle in another
recent symposium contribution.  Jacoby, supra note 23. 
31. See Robert B. Avery et al., An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. 
RES. BULL., 47, 69 tbl.11 (2003) (reporting actions reported by collection agencies). 
32. Id. at 67 tbl.10 (reporting medical judgments grouped by size). 
33. Most versions of an optimal universal health care finance system do not envision first-
dollar coverage for regular medical needs for non-poor households, although medical expenses can 
be cumulatively burdensome.  See, e.g., AARON & SCHWARTZ WITH COX, supra note 25, at 95 
(stating that health insurance efficiency is principally intended to protect against the “risk of large 
and burdensome financial losses”).  Some patients may prefer insurance offering comprehensive 
coverage even for small medical bills.  See Glied, supra note 13, at 55 (“front-end coverage with a 
low-benefit maximum is likely to be perceived as more valuable than catastrophic coverage by low-
income uninsured people”).  This preference matches to some extent with the prepaid group practice 
approach to health care finance and delivery.  See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven, Open the Markets and 
Level the Playing Field, in TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY HEALTH SYSTEM: THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
PROMISE OF PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 237 (comparing comprehensive and low 
cost-sharing features of PGP as compared to consumer driven health plans); Raymond Fink & 
Merwyn R. Greenlick, Prepaid Group Practice and Health Care Research, in TOWARD A 21ST 
CENTURY HEALTH SYSTEM: THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROMISE OF PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE, 
supra note 3, at 158 (describing common features of PGPs). 
34. For research using longitudinal data and finding large proportions of the population having
been in poverty or using means tested welfare programs at some point in time, see Mark R. Rank & 
Thomas A. Hirschl, Rags or Riches? Estimating the Probabilities of Poverty and Affluence Across 
the American Life Span, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 651, 665–67 (2001) (“half of Americans in the general 
population will experience poverty during adulthood, half of Americans . . . will experience 
affluence, and the chances of experiencing one economic extreme versus the other are roughly 
50/50.”); Mark R. Rank & Thomas A. Hirschl, The Likelihood of Poverty Across the American Adult 
Life Span, 44 SOC. WORK 201, 205–11 (1999) (stating poverty statistics for different age groups); 
Mark R. Rank & Thomas A. Hirschl, Welfare Use as a Life Course Event: Toward a New 
Understanding of the U.S. Safety Net, 47 SOC. WORK 237, 240–44 (2002) (noting that two-thirds of 
Americans between the ages of 20 and 65 will at some point reside in a household that receives 
welfare benefits).  See generally JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 137–63 (2006) (discussing 
risks in United States healthcare). 
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even small amounts of unexpected medical debt that arise at particular 
times.  In addition, small medical debts may signify a lack of clarity or 
transparency over the scope of coverage rather than an under-insurance 
problem per se.  Medical providers or their collectors may pursue 
informal or formal collection against patients who reasonably believe 
their insurance companies are paying a bigger proportion of bills than 
they actually do.35
Delinquency on smaller medical debts also may be evidence of the 
absence of well-priced credit products that could smooth consumption 
for more routine medical liabilities.  Households rely, at least to some 
extent, on credit rather than insurance for other significant and important 
expenses such as home ownership, cars, and education.  These kinds of 
expenses are not so different from recurring costs of preventive and basic 
care, to which some of the standard economic explanations for health 
insurance apply with far less force.36  Many of the medical-specific 
credit products I have seen so far anticipate unrealistically short payoffs 
or have steep interest rates.37  But well-designed credit products issued 
by, say, community development credit unions, may be a useful 
supplement to insurance for some kinds of health care consumption—at 
least in the event that truly comprehensive prepaid group practices fail to 
take hold again.  In any event, whether medical debt delinquency is due 
to under-insurance, lack of transparency, or the absence of appropriate 
35. For myriad cases involving debt collection disputes regarding amounts uncovered by
insurance, see, for example, Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(involving plaintiff’s allegation that his credit report contained medical debts that he did not owe); 
Spence v. TRW, Inc., 92 F.3d 380, 381 (6th Cir. 1996) (involving a credit report that referenced a 
debt for medical services that the plaintiff claimed was his insurer’s responsibility); Kaplan v. 
Assetcare, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (upholding validity of plaintiff’s claim 
against debt collector that allegedly attempted collection of a medical debt purportedly covered by 
plaintiff’s insurance); Finnegan III v. University of Rochester Medical Center, 21 F. Supp. 2d 223, 
228–29 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that plaintiff had a claim against debt collectors when plaintiff 
alleged that the collectors had pursued collection of a medical debt that plaintiff had repeatedly 
disputed); Blake v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41, 44–45 (W.Va. 1997) 
(concerning patient’s fraud claim against hospital that won default judgment to collect the portion of 
patient’s medical expenses that insurer did not pay); Victory Memorial Hospital v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 
117, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (reversing a directed verdict for the patient in a hospital’s suit to 
recover payment for medical services). 
36. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care
Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 806 (2006) (discussing how, under the classic conception of insurance, 
preventive care is not an insurable risk).  It is not unheard of in health policy to analogize to other 
consumer expenditures in various ways.  Victor Fuchs and Alan Garber analogize insurance for 
health care to insurance for the purchase of a car.  AARON & SCHWARTZ WITH COX, supra note 25, 
at 2; see also Victor R. Fuchs & Alan M. Garber, Health and Medical Care, in AGENDA FOR THE 
NATION 145, 172–73 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2003) (analogizing to the purchase of computers). 
37. See, e.g., Jacoby & Warren, supra note 22, at 559–60 (listing various medical-specific
credit products). 
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credit products, it can impose significant emotional distress and 
adversely affect credit scores, which in turn may affect access to credit, 
rental housing, and employment.38
My musings here suggest that an increased rate of insurance is not an 
automatic panacea for the underlying issues for which insurance 
coverage is often used as a proxy.  Even assuming it does not itself 
impose financial pressure on a household, health insurance as it is now 
known protects against some but not nearly all of the financial risks 
associated with medical problems.  A lack of financial protection can 
undercut the other underlying goal of covering the uninsured, namely 
health care delivery.  Debtor-patients often report in surveys that medical 
debt and other financial problems deter them from seeking health care 
and adhering to prescription drug regimens.39  
I will end by commenting on another dimension of the discussion of 
individual mandates to buy health insurance.  As noted earlier, the 
individual mandates are supposed to override subjective beliefs about the 
value of insurance and to incorporate younger and healthier residents into 
the risk pool.  Some proponents of individual mandates believe they are 
necessary to combat free riding by those who “choose” more freely to be 
uninsured, consume health care without paying for it, and impose costs 
on others.40  As in the parallel debates over the cost implications of a 
generous bankruptcy system, the scope of the free rider problem is not 
38. See, e.g., Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, 90 FED. 
RES. BULL. 297, 312, 314–20 (2004) (estimating credit score impact of mistakes regarding medical 
collection). 
39. See, e.g., Jacoby & Warren, supra note 22, at 582. 
40. See, e.g., Press Release Arnold Schwarzenegger, supra note 2 (employees who turn down
coverage contribute to higher costs for those with health insurance); Peter Harbage & Len M. 
Nichols, A Premium Price: The Hidden Costs all Californians Pay in our Fragmented Health Care 
System, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 2–4 (Dec. 2006) (unpaid medical bills result in increased costs 
for those with health insurance).  For a refutation of the uninsured-by-choice argument, see Health 
Access California, An Individual Mandate for Health Insurance: Unwise, Unwarranted, 
Unworkable, HEALTH ACCESS, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.health-
access.org/expanding/docs/access.project.Ind.Mandate120406.pdf.  The nature of the arguments 
used to advocate for individual mandates parallel some of strands of the successful advocacy for 
bankruptcy reform that culminated in major changes in 2005.  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8 § 102, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).  In debates and 
hearings, lawmakers suggested that the American people should object to paying the tax that 
bankruptcy imposes on households in the form of higher prices on credit, goods, and services.  See, 
e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S2113 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (“I rise today on
behalf of every American who each year is forced unknowingly to pay a hidden tax.  We all know
we have to pay an income tax, a sales tax, a payroll tax, but what about a bankruptcy tax? You may
not have heard of this tax, but you and every other man, woman, and child in America pay it every
single year. . . . According to a Department of Justice study, the bankruptcy tax amounts to a
staggering $400 for every man, woman, and child in America once a year every year.”).
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entirely clear.41  In any event, other kinds of laws from the debtor-
creditor world could be enlisted to target the behavior thought to be 
undesirable.  For example, federal lawmakers could reduce the 
dischargeability of medical debts in bankruptcy for younger and more 
well-off filers.42  Although medical debt collection already has 
significant consequences for individuals of modest means,43 states could 
bolster medical providers’ debt collection tools for higher income 
people.44  In addition, consumer financial education—a tool mentioned 
frequently in debtor-creditor and consumer credit debates—should 
include insurance topics and not be limited to credit.45  Whether 
independent of or in conjunction with a mandate, these kinds of steps 
could increase the extent to which citizens value health insurance and 
their willingness to pay into the health care system.
41. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at w451 (calling “vastly overstated” the uncompensated
care justifications for an individual mandate).  Some research illustrates that uncompensated care is 
not entirely a function of the totally and chronically uninsured.  See John Shiels et al., Cost and 
Coverage Estimates for the “Healthy Americans Act,” THE LEWIN GROUP 14 (December 12, 2006) 
(working paper, on file with The University of Kansas Law Review, 
http://www.lewin.com/NR/rdonlyres/37BD21DB-BEFE-4C2F-AFEA-
802BDF91EAD7/0/HealthyAmericansActAnalysis.pdf) (reporting on split of authority on extent of 
hospital cost-shifting to insured in terms of increased charges); Harbage & Nichols, supra note 40, at 
3 (stating that “there is reason to believe that the underinsured, particularly in California’s 
government programs, contribute significantly to cost-shifting, thereby adding even higher costs to 
private premiums.”); Karoline Mortensen, Emergency Department Utilization of the Intermittently 
Uninsured, ECON. RES. INITIATIVE ON THE UNINSURED (Aug. 25, 2006) at 
http://eriu.sph.umich.edu/pdf/conf2006_mortensen.pdf (finding that the combination of uninsured 
patients and low reimbursement rates from Medicaid beneficiaries are detrimental to a hospital’s 
bottom line). 
42. In theory, Congress has furthered this goal by implementing a detailed means test for
chapter 7 filers with higher incomes.  See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).  In reality, however, the means test 
may not be well suited to achieving this goal. 
43. See Avery et al., supra note 38, at 318–20 (discussing the impact of medical collection on
credit score); A Review of Hospital Billing and Collection Practices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. 107 (2004) (testimony of Prof. Melissa B. Jacoby) 
(discussing the various negative effects of medical debt on modest income families in the context of 
bankruptcy). 
44. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 22, at 565-570 (reporting on special debt collection
entitlements for medical service providers under various state laws). 
45. See generally Geeta Menon et al., Health Risk Perceptions and Consumer Psychology, in
HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY (Curtis Haugtvedt et al. eds.) (forthcoming); SWARTZ, 
supra note 7, at 36 (“Interviews indicate that most view health insurance premiums as high relative 
to their expected medical expenses.  It was striking that those under age forty spoke about health 
insurance as if it were prepaid medical care.  They seemed to ignore the fact that insurance would 
enable them to shift the risk of high costs to insurers in exchange for a known monthly cost.  Yet 
most knew that they did not have enough money to pay for serious medical care.”). 
